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.....The range of economic activity that can be effectively
coordinated across a complex multi-firm supply chain is
just starting to be explored by companies and those who
do research on these subjects. The boundaries of the firm,
transaction costs, supply chain architecture and
coordination, and outsourcing are all facets of a large
mosaic in which incentives, communication and
coordination, and the boundaries of the firm are worked
out. The outsourcing extends to the employment
relationship, where again the relative costs of in-house and
the outsourced resources may have shifted. I hasten to
add that these issues are far from being settled in the
world of practice and the world of economic research.
(Michael Spence, 2002, p. 456)
1. Introduction
Fiercer global competition, rapid technological change, and
choosier customers are forcing firms to seek more efficient
production and distribution structures. In recent years,
industries have shown increasing collaboration on issues of
product development, quality guarantee systems and
improved logistics. Spot markets are being replaced by
contract-production and systems of vertical coordination.
More coordination and collaboration may lead to improved
efficiency in production and distribution channels and to
more product and market innovations. These vertical
relationships can take many forms, like strategic alliances,
long-term contracts, licensing, subcontracting, joint ventures,
franchising, cooperatives, and networks. The importance
of these developments is not only witnessed by the focus
of this journal (Omta et al., 2001), but also by the above
citation from a recent Nobel Prize lecture.
Many stakeholders are involved in chains and networks,
like employers and employees in the various stages,
consumers, capital providers, insurance companies,
governmental agencies, and so on. They have conflicting
as well as joint interests.
Governance is about the organization of their transactions,
while a governance structure consists of a collection of rules
/ institutions / constraints structuring the transactions
between the various stakeholders. Examples include the
allocation of property rights (chain and network
directorship), the capital structure, the reward system, the
board of directors, public codes and regulations, the pressure
of large investors, the competition in the product and labor
market, the organizational structure, the accounting system,
and so on. These aspects of governance structure have a
large impact on the flow of formal and informal
information, the bringing to value of asymmetric
information, and the structure and impact of formal (hard)
and relational (soft) contracts.
Governance matters because contracts are in general
incomplete. Contractual incompleteness is due to the
impossibility to specify everything ex ante. There is only a
role for a governance structure ex post, when it is costly to
design contracts based on observable future variables. If
certain aspects are therefore unspecified, then there will be
ex post a quasi-surplus which has to be divided, and ex ante
investment decisions will determine the size of the quasi-
surplus. A governance structure affects the size of the surplus
that will be generated by its effects on investments, the
efficiency of bargaining, and risk-aversion (Zingales, 1998). 
The aim of the research agenda ‘Governance of Chains and
Networks’ is to describe and explain governance choices in
chains and networks and how they affect the behavior of the
parties involved. Four themes are distinguished in this
article. Section 2 deals with the assignment of decision
rights in the form of authority and responsibility, where
decision rights concern all rights / rules regarding the
deployment and use of assets (Hansmann, 1996). Section
3 addresses income rights by way of the remuneration of the
various stakeholders in chains and networks, where income
rights are rights to receive the benefits and obligations to pay
the costs that are associated with the use of an asset. Research
regarding these two themes entails investigating the trade-
offs involved in changing governance structures with respect
to the distribution of revenues and costs as well as the
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Governance concerns the organization of transactions. Four research themes regarding the governance of chains and
networks are identified: decision rights, income rights, alignment, and cognition.
allocation of authority / power. Section 4 focuses on
alignment. The distinction between the previous two
research themes and alignment is that the former is
concerned with issues regarding opposing interests, while
the latter is focused on joint interests. Section 5 highlights
limited cognitive capacities in relation to governance. The
three previous themes have paid some attention to this
theme, but this has hardly been made explicit. Section 6
provides a summary and conclusions.
2. Governance and decision rights
Coase (1937) asked the question: ‘What is a firm?’ This
question is not trivial because everything that can be
produced in the entire society can in principle also be
produced by one centrally planned organization. Coase
proposed a distinction between transaction modes that are
‘internal’ and ‘external’ to the firm. There are costs in
maintaining a continuous presence in markets and engaging
in spot transactions, while internal transactions entail
bureaucratic costs. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) have
challenged this distinction by questioning whether there
is a difference between a customer firing his grocer and an
employer firing an employee. Subsequent developments,
like Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Hart and Moore
(1990), have mainly taken this route in analyzing governance
structure choice. Empirical support for the importance of
property rights is provided by Johnson et al. (2002). The
next subtheme formulates research questions along this
line of inquiry. The distinction between ‘internal’ and
‘external’ transaction modes has been carried forward by
Simon (1951) and Williamson (1985). The next two
subthemes build on this distinction. 
Formal versus real authority
An incomplete contract is completed by allocating authority
to somebody. This person decides, according to his own
interest, what is most desirable in the prevailing circumstances.
A central issue regarding governance is therefore the ‘make
or not-make’ decision. The theory of the firm, e.g. transaction
costs economics and property rights theory, is concerned
with intermediate products, i.e. vertical relationships. The
‘make-or-not-make’ decision boils down to the ‘make-or-
buy’ decision. An important issue in organizing the firm is
therefore the allocation of control and authority, i.e. chain
directorship. This allocation involves inevitable trade-offs in
the choice of governance structure, because moving authority
downward in a chain or network entails taking power away
upstream (Hendrikse and Bijman, 2002a). Related issues
arise regarding the allocation of decision rights in joint
ventures and public-private partnerships. 
There are a number of other research questions. Standard
incomplete contracting indicates that the employee should
be the owner of the assets when the relationship-specific
investments of the employee are most important (Hart and
Moore, 1990). However, this seems to be at odds with a
basic feature of the firm. Crucial to the notion of the firm
is the centralization of decision making power; i.e. the
employer, not the employee, is the owner of the firm. This
seems problematic from an efficiency perspective when the
relationship-specific investments of the employee are most
important. Rajan and Zingales (1998) have formulated a
solution by distinguishing ownership and access to assets,
where ownership resides at the top and access to an agent
is allowed or not. The efficient design of access to and in
chains and networks is a major challenge.
Another way out of this problem (of the centralization of
formal authority) is to view ownership as more than a
simple (non-contingent) long-term contract allocating
decision rights. Formal authority does not preclude that
control is delegated to another party, e.g. the employee or
a professional management. Formal authority resides at
the top, whereas informal authority can be either centralized
or decentralized. So, the efficiency of a relationship may
be enhanced by giving up some control, i.e. giving real
authority away, even though the formal control stays at the
top (Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Baker, et al., 1999, 2002).
These ideas regarding contingent decision rights are not
only implemented in function and task design, but also in
the allocation of decision authority in the design of financial
instruments (Aghion and Bolton, 1992).
Relational contracts
Relationships within firms are rarely mediated by explicit
contacts alone. The incompleteness of contracts implies
that formal authority can only be allocated to a limited
extent. Informal aspects of organizations have to be
considered together with the formal aspects in the design
of governance structures. Informal means of enforcing
contracts are therefore also needed, like implicit contracts.
The role of implicit / relational contracts is to utilize the
parties’ detailed knowledge of their situation to adapt to
new contingencies as they arise.
The rules embedding transactions can therefore be formal
as well as informal. The formal rules are represented by the
(allocation of) decision rights of an incomplete contract,
while the informal rules are captured by an implicit /
relational contract. The performance of formal
organizational structures and institutions depends
importantly on the informal relationships that these
structures and institutions facilitate, where the informal
rules serve to complete the incomplete contract. Implicit /
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relational contracts, i.e. credible informal agreements, have
to be designed in such a way that the reputation of each
party is sufficiently important to adhere to the informal
agreement in order to bring detailed knowledge to value. The
allocation of formal rights determines not only the identity
of the party developing a reputation, but also the costs and
benefits of adhering to an informal contract.
Hybrid organizations, like networks, franchises, partnerships,
intermediaries, sub-contracting, distribution channels,
collective trademarks, and alliances, are often described as
long-term relationships involving trust. The implicit
implication is that trust seems to be occurring only in these
governance structures. However, relationships in vertically
integrated structures are usually also characterized by a
long-term relationship. Trust plays therefore an important
feature in the employer - employee relationship as well.
The asymmetric treatment of long-term relationships seems
therefore ad hoc; i.e. the difference between trust in ‘internal’
versus ‘external’ transaction modes is not well understood.
Conflict resolution
Compensating for the incompleteness of contracts, a
governance structure is designed to foster efficiency in
transacting by deterring one party from appropriating the
other, coordinating exchange, and resolving disputes which
are due to differences in judgments (partly motivated by
differences in objectives). In the absence of well-functioning
legal institutions or vertical integration, other means of
enforcing contracts are needed, either formal or informal. The
standard modelling of relational contracts uses the Folk
theorem of the theory of repeated games. Relational contracts
are sustained by reciprocity; i.e. bad behaviour today will
be punished tomorrow by ending the relationship. However,
are punishments as unforgiving as depicted by this approach?
Are there other means of enforcing relational contracts which
support the stability of these governance structures? Empirical
work by McMillan and Woodruff (1999) suggests that a
much richer variety of means is used to sustain relational
contracts, where network features play an important role.
3. Governance and income rights
The desirability and stability of a chain or network is
determined by its participants and the incentives for good
performance facing them. There are many causes (and
solutions) for possible frictions in these organizations. A
party becomes a member of a certain chain or network
when it is in its own interests, which is determined by the
other participants, the possible choices, the available
information, and the distribution of costs and revenue
schemes. This raises issues regarding optimal cost-sharing
schemes, monitoring rules, self-selection devices, and
enforcement considerations in chains and networks.
Payments are structured in a way to reduce the conflict of
interests between the parties, and extra information is
gathered and used to reduce the information asymmetry. The
costs of asymmetric information are for example dealt with
by other payoff schemes, or another allocation of tasks. A
complete contracting perspective seems to be most
appropriate in order to deal with conflicting interests and
asymmetric information (Hendrikse, 2003).
More than two parties
Traditional analysis of vertical relationships usually only
considers two parties. A chain consists of at least three
parties; i.e. there is at least one party in the middle. This
party is a buyer of the upstream product / service, while
being a seller to the downstream party at the same time. A
network is even more complicated because it consists of a
chain together with the interdependent relationships
surrounding it. This multi-party nature of chains and
networks raises several issues which are absent in a two-
party relationship, e.g. the power of the party in the middle,
the fact that the party in the middle is agent as well as
principal at the same time, the stability of contractual
arrangements between two adjacent parties (Tirole, 1986),
and the intensity of incentives (Dixit, 1997).
Competition
Standard economic theory predicts the convergence of
governance structures over time; i.e. the selection process of
the market winnows out the efficient governance structure.
However, many sectors exhibit a variety of governance
structures over substantial periods of time, e.g. co-operatives
as well as stock-listed companies have substantial market
shares in many agricultural markets (Hendrikse, 1998).
Does the market not perform its selection function well, or
are certain value-enhancing services / functions provided
by the competition between various governance structures
at the same time? Hendrikse and Bijman (2002b) address
the forces of self-selection and countervailing power, while
Rajan and Zingales (2000) focus on building sustainable
competitive advantage by building a network of
complementarities with limited access for outside parties.
Each stage in the production chain is also part of a specific
sector / industry, i.e. horizontal considerations have an
impact on the chain. The ‘make-or-not-make’ decision boils
down to the ‘make-or-compete’ decision. The field of
industrial organization focuses on this topic, with
considerations like economies of scale, barriers to entry,
innovation, and the intensity of the competitive process.
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4. Governance and alignment
People / firms take specific courses of action in order to do
specialized work and use tools that are geared towards their
task. This is attractive from a productivity perspective, but
specialization also entails problems, like providing the right
incentives and establishing coordination. This may frustrate
the potential productivity gains. Specialization has to be
accompanied by alignment in order to establish
coordination and complementarity between chain and
network activities.
Coordination
Chain and network parties are regularly confronted with
exceptional or unclear situations, in which the desirable
course of action is not immediately clear from the perspective
of the whole chain or network. Coordination problems are
situations in which one does not know which decision
aligns best with other decisions in the chain or network.
Various solutions for coordination problems have been
formulated in a two-party context, like setting prices or
quantities (income rights), organization / centralization
(decision rights), regular meetings, installing information
and communication technologies. Coordination problems
are much more challenging when three or more parties are
involved. It seems that especially the performance on the
criteria robustness and simplicity (Milgrom and Roberts,
1992) will be affected in a major way by the change to three
or more parties, which will probably have implications for
the desirability of the various coordination devices.
Complementarity
The transformation of chains and networks has implications
for work practices, strategy, products and services, supplier
and customer relationships. The fit between organizational,
accounting, communication, financial, production, logistics
and marketing attributes of chains and networks becomes
important. Increasing synergies between production,
distribution and marketing among firms will have an impact
on the investment decisions of each party. Investments in
one tier of the chain or network must be coordinated with
investments in other tiers to obtain optimal performance.
As there are complementarities among the activities of
different chain participants, the governance of these
relationships matters.
Issues in governance have traditionally been concerned
with the provision of investment incentives and the
resolution of hold-up problems. However, the allocation
of authority is not only determined by the need to provide
investment incentives, and incentives for investment are
provided by a variety of means, of which ownership is just
one. A richer approach considers various instruments, which
requires a system of attributes view (Milgrom and Roberts,
1990). The crucial concept regarding the relationship
between the various instruments is complementarity. It
gears the attention towards the interdependencies between
these various attributes of chains and networks, and results
in the identification of combinations of these attributes
which are viable. This raises a number of issues. 
First, the contracting externalities between the various
instruments guiding these attributes have to be considered
(Holmström and Roberts, 1991, 1994). This breaks the
symmetric treatment of intra- and inter-organizational
relationships; i.e. internal organizations are a world on their
own. Chains and networks have therefore probably their
own logic. Second, system innovation becomes a major
issue. Solow (1987) observed with regard to the introduction
of new information technologies that ‘You can see the
computer age everywhere except in the productivity statistics’.
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) show that substantial
productivity increases emerge once the adoption of new
information technologies is accompanied by changes in
supplier relationships, customer relationships, work
practices, strategy, and products and services.
Third, a complementarity perspective has implications for
the pace of change. It advocates ‘all-or-nothing’ (Big Bang)
change, but gradual change is often observed. It is not clear
what is most desirable (Dewatripont and Roland, 1992).
Finally, although all attributes of a chain or network matter,
it is usually a specific attribute, e.g. transparency, complexity
or governance, that drives the choice of the other attributes
in order to bring the various complementarities in the system
to value. The specific chain / network has to indicate which
of these aspects is most important. For example, the
specificity of investments seems to be the driving attribute
in the organization of fruit and vegetable chains, whereas
it is not in the organization of the flower chain.
5. Governance and cognition
The impact of cognitive capabilities and perceptions of the
various chain and network participants on the choice of
governance structure are highlighted in the following
subsections.
Complexity
Transaction costs economics has stressed the role of
governance structures in alleviating the ex ante as well as ex
post problems associated with asset specificity. Incomplete
contracting theory focuses on ex ante investment incentives
because almost all ex post problems are anticipated; i.e.
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contractual incompleteness is not endogenous in the theory.
The problems associated with asset specificity are driving
the analysis. However, many problems are so complex that
only a limited number of problems and choices can be
anticipated ex ante. Complexity rather than asset specificity
may therefore guide the choice of governance structure. A
shift in attention towards ex post instead of ex ante incentive
problems will have repercussions for the efficient choice
of governance structure (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001).
A second complexity issue regarding governance concerns the
classic ‘make or not-make’ decision. Many organizations are
involved in activities which have very limited vertical or
horizontal interactions with the activities of a specific
network. The ‘make-or-not-make’ decision boils down to
the ‘make-or-abandon’ decision. This is the topic of
diversification. Diversification or divestiture decisions entail
that somehow a new internal organizational equilibrium is
preferred above the current one. However, the considerations
driving these decisions have not been formulated in a
coherent framework which addresses the efficient scope of
the organization, and therefore the chain and network.
Third, traditional analysis of vertical relationships usually
only considers two parties. Chain and network analyses are
geared towards situations consisting of at least three parties.
The number of possible interactions increases exponentially
when the number of parties increases, which raises issues
regarding the span of control, decay in quality of information
transmission when more parties are involved, and the
efficient boundaries of a network.
Form follows function
A well-known insight from evolutionary biology is that
‘form follows function’; i.e. the design of a species evolves
in such a way that it is fit for the environment in which it
has to survive (Cosmides and Tooby, 1994). An example
in the field of management is the observation by Chandler
(1962) that ‘structure follows strategy’, inspired by the
evolution of the multi-divisional form at General Motors.
However, a lot of research takes as its starting point the
reverse sequence; i.e. the governance structure is chosen
first, and investment decisions are taken subsequently. The
same topic is relevant for the governance of chains and
networks.
Inertia regarding change
Organizational change is a recurring phenomenon. Popular
press accounts report frequently about mergers, divestitures,
replacements of CEOs, organizational restructuring, and
so on. A puzzling feature of these organizational changes
is the timing of their implementation. In many situations
considerable delay occurs in actually implementing a
desirable organizational change. Another puzzling aspect
regarding organizational and governance change is that
often all the involved parties acknowledge after the
implementation that everybody knew already that
something had to be changed. A third aspect of
organizational change is that the involved parties may have
vested interests. It boils down to questions like: Are certain
governance structures more inert to change than others?,
Is there a life cycle of a governance structure?, and so on.
Problems of cognition and learning play an important role
in these inertial aspects of the change of governance structure.
Governance structures regarding chains and networks
channel the data perceived and the way they are made
meaningful by agents. This buffers and constrains the diverse
and variable actions of many agents (Hodgson, 1998). The
relevance of these considerations is reflected in the switch
from so-called ‘supply chain management’ to ‘demand-
oriented chains and networks’. 
6. Summary and conclusions
The research agenda presented in this article has formulated
the relevance of governance for the emerging field of Chain
and Network Science. It has also distinguished the themes
of decision rights, income rights, alignment and cognition
which entails research questions such as:
• How does efficient chain directorship reflect technological
and demand developments?
• Is detailed local knowledge best brought to value by
granting access or by delegating authority?
• How are relational contracts enforced?
• Does the intensity of incentives decrease when the number
of chain and network participants increases?
• Why do different governance structures coexist in the
same industry?
• Which coordination mechanisms are used in chains and
networks, and why?
• Which principle drives the coherence in chains and
networks?
• Is Big-Bang system innovation desirable?
• Does complexity or asset specificity drive the choice of
governance structure?
• Are governance aspects the driving force behind change
in chains and networks?
• Are there path dependencies in the choice of governance
structure?
Making progress regarding these themes and research
questions entails establishing a number of insights which
may turn CNS into a scientific field of inquiry, with its own
concepts and tools. This requires not only developing these
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concepts with input disciplines like economics and
management, social sciences, information sciences,
technological sciences, cognitive sciences, and law, but also
developing chain- and network-specific methodologies and
tools together with chain and network parties. Developing
concepts jointly with enterprises is potentially very fruitful,
as was already recognized as early as 1957 by Koopmans
(1957, p145) when he wrote ‘The task of linking concepts
with observations demands a great deal of detailed
knowledge of the realities of economic life’.
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